psychological trauma (Azrin & Nunn, 1973) .
Since then the term has spread and is used for a growing variety of events: human-caused accidents (e.g. Kreps, 1984; Spiro et al., 2012) , financial crises and incidents on financial markets (e.g., Jackwerth & Rubinstein, 1996; Longin, 2000; Pagan & Sossounov, 2003) , terrorism (e.g., Grossi & Kunreuther, 2005) , or more generally risk management (e.g., Haimes, 1991; Slovic & Weber, 2002) , engineering (e.g. Castillo, Hadi, Balakrishnan, & Sarabia, 2005) , and medicine (e.g., Sanders, 2005; Tramèr et al., 2001) . The overwhelming majority of these scientific writings does not give a definition for 'extreme events'. While some seem to exclude impacts in their implicit understandings of the term, others clearly focus primarily on impacts when declaring an event extreme (e.g., Grossi & Kunreuther, 2005; Kreps, 1984; Sanders, 2005; Slovic & Weber, 2002) . Additionally, this approach of centring on impacts has moved beyond social sciences and can be found in medicine, all the way to natural sciences (e.g., Descamps et al., 2015; Gutschick & BassiriRad, 2003; Smith, 2011; Tramèr et al., 2001; Zedler, Gautier, & McMaster, 1983) .
A Web of Science's Results Analysis on the frequency of the term's usagestarting with articles from 1967 to todayreveals a steady growth in the use of 'extreme event' since 1991 (Web of Science, 2018) . This upsurge in popularity is due to a rising interest in phenomena of climatic change. Early examples to actively link anthropogenic climate change with the occurrence of extreme (weather) events were Borrego and Lopes (1970) , Gleick (1986) , Kates, Ausubel, and Berberian (1985) , Mearns, Katz, and Schneider (1984) , Parry (1978) , Riebsame (1988) , and Wilson and Mitchell (1987) . Though even in the first IPCC impact assessment reports there was consensus only regarding the severe impact any 'extreme event' would have, but great uncertainty regarding the influence of climate change on the frequency and magnitude of these so-called extreme events (IPCC, 1990 (IPCC, , 1993 (IPCC, , 1996 . Hence the quest for proof of the hypothesis that global warming affects 'extreme events' brought with it the term's frequent useonce again with a focus on the occurrence rather than impacts in their definition, explaining the dominance of related scientific fields and the exclusion of impacts in the majority of texts to this day.
The study of 'extreme events' did not only begin with the application of the phrase but with several other terms, in particular 'disaster' and catastrophe'. The Web of Science's Results Analysis likewise reveals: these terms rose in use already since the 1970s. But while 'catastrophe' experienced slow growth, 'extreme event' grew significantly since the early 1990s overtaking 'catastrophe' by 1996. Till today 'disaster' is still the term most in use.
It is important to elucidate that the terms often applied in a synonymous fashion are frequently not congruent. For instance, in the case of 'disaster' the core defining characteristic is a different one; it is neither the event's occurrence, nor its impacts, but rather the response to it. Any event that required exceptional responses, but for which response was insufficient or even failed would be a 'disaster' in conjunction with the definition put forth by Quarantelli (1985) , who contributed significantly to the issue of finding the ultimate definition for the term (see, e.g., Perry & Quarantelli, 2005; Quarantelli, 1989 Quarantelli, , 1998 . Therefore, 'extreme event' and 'disaster' cannot be interchangeably used since focus is laid differently.
The discussion above reveals divergent understandings of what characterizes extreme events. At the same time, the differing definitions overlap, impeding a close exchange of scientific knowledge beyond the disciplinary boundaries. Since interdisciplinarity of different disciplines is getting ever more relevant (Bridle et al., 2013; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006) , a broad and comprehensive definition will allow the transfer of knowledge from seemingly unrelated fields that might lead to cogent academic advancements. The following section aims at proposing a comprehensive, i.e. meta-definition of extreme events.
Extreme events defined
Generally speaking, a definition of extreme events demands a clear conception of the terms events, event's impacts, and extremes. At first the terms will be analysed in more detail in isolation and then merged into a novel definition. However, since the definition shall allow for a multilevel and interdisciplinary perspective, the complex systems approach is used as methodological foundation. It permits events and their impacts to be displayed within, but also between systems.
Methodological foundation: the complex systems approach
Complex systems can be characterized as a set-up of systems, which are determined by systems' elements, i.e. components, and their numerosity as well as their correlations (Ladyman, Lambert, & Wiesner, 2013) . These define the structure and functioning of a system and thus, distinguish the systems. Interdependencies between elements can create nonlinearity via feedback loops. Because of a lack of central control these systems exhibit spontaneous order, which also leads to a certain level of robustness. The level of robustness can differ between the systems (Ladyman et al., 2013) . The emergence of higher levels of organisation through the interaction of systems creates a hierarchical structure of systems within complex systems. A biological organism is such a complex system, its elements, or components, are the organism's cells; likewise, cells are complex systems (Bodenschatz, 2010) .
Events
Event originates from the Latin evenire meaning "to come" (Weekley, 1921) , i.e. it describes a non-stationary situation. The sophistication of this definition has been much discussed in philosophy (e.g. Steward, 1997) , which led to the identification of the following characteristics: events occur in a short period of time, but have no such restrictions in spatial terms (Casati & Varzi, 2015) , they occupy time and within that have different stages, thus they develop and change quickly (Hacker, 1982) . Each event is unique in its appearance, i.e. events are entities of which no two are the same (Davidson, 1969 (Davidson, , 1980 . Thus, an event is a dynamic occurrence within a limited time frame fixed in time. Typically, events are not strictly spatially bounded, although ex post the spatial extent of an event should be clearly definable.
Transferring this characterization to the systems perspective, elementsas a core of systemsare "capable of behaviour", meaning they have properties prone to change (Jones, 1982) . Thus, in the context of complex systems events can be defined, therefore, as the dynamic behaviour of an element within a limited timeframe.
Impacts
Impact in its general usage simply means "marked effect or influence" (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018) . Within the complex systems' approach this definition implies impacts to be the effects one or more elements' behaviours have on the behaviour of one or more other elements. The 'other elements' could belong to the system of the driving force(s), but also to one or more other systems. Furthermore, the effects on other elements could occur simultaneously or in cascading fashion.
The size of the impact depends amongst other aspects crucially on the vulnerability of the affected system(s) because the susceptibility of a system to react or change at the instant of an event occurring is instrumental in eliciting substantial impacts. While complex systems are said to have a certain level of robustness (Ladyman et al., 2013) , its flip side is a system's vulnerability, which Gallopín (2003, p. 2) defines "as its propensity to undergo significant transformations […] ."
Extremes
The word 'extreme' has its origins in the Latin extremus meaning "utmost" (Weekley, 1921) . Extremes occur rarely, or with low probability. In the most general sense, the term can be defined as outliers to the normal condition. Normal condition in this instance means the usual, i.e. typical behaviour an element displays, either as initial event, or as impact.
Traditionally in extreme events research, there are but two aspects of an event that can turn extreme: occurrence and impact (Jahn, 2015) . Combining the considerations on extremes with the earlier definition of events, occurrence extremes are those instances in which an element displays atypical behaviour. In the case of an occurrence extreme or an unfortunate coinciding of events, common in themselves, other elements may be impacted in such a way as to likewise display atypical behaviour. This is an impact extreme.
The assumption is that elements within a system are accustomed to each other's usual behaviour and remain within the normal range of their own behaviour, adjusting it minimally in relation to each other. This condition is probably best compared to and described as a dynamic equilibrium. In that state the overall system is functioning normally, i.e. operates in the intended or usual way. The question of how to determine whether a system is functioning the way it usually does, or was created for (in instances of human-made systems) depends on the system's complexity (its various functionalities) and the mode of operation it most frequently adheres to over time.
A more tangible definition is beyond the scope of this paper, as the comparison of the two following examples will highlight: The system under observation in our case study in Section 4 is the electricity system. Its normal function is the provision of electricity to consumers. In the incident described in the case study electricity was no longer provided, a blackout occurred, which is not its usual or intended mode of operation. A system highly different to this one is the human brain. Its normal functioning is by far more difficult to define, as discussed by Lehnertz (2006) in detail. Its main functions are so diverseprocessing information provided by the senses, regulating organ functions and thus, for example, blood pressure and breathing, and releasing hormones to name but a fewthat it is easiest defined by the neuron activity it displays most of the time while maintaining these functionalities.
A proposed meta-definition
Depending on the system's robustness, any extreme behaviour by one or more of its elements may be absorbed within the system, not impeding its overall functioning. From a systems perspective, the instance, in which the overall system or related systems within the complex systems structure malfunction, is of interest.
Bringing the above discussed and defined terms together, the following definition is proposed:
An extreme event is a dynamic occurrence within a limited timeframe that impedes the normal functioning of a system or systems.
The proposed meta-definition highlights the importance of the complex systems perspective while at the same time not excluding those approaches used to determine extreme events in the various disciplines. Solely those events are excluded that do not disrupt the functioning of an entire system or even systems.
The flowchart in Fig. 1 expands upon the definition and depicts how to go about identifying, or even predicting an extreme event.
Events occur within systems, which by definition consist of interrelating elements that affect each other. Any behaviour an element displays within a limited timeframe is an event. Any event marked by an occurrence extreme, i.e. an element's extreme behaviour, or not, will have impacts on other elements within that system, or even within a higher-level system, of which the original system is a part. Should that impact be severe so that the impacted elements display extreme behaviour in turn, be it for only a short amount of time or longer-term, then the event is also characterized by an impact extreme. Occurrence extremes and impact extremes are strong indicators for an extreme event, however neither necessary nor sufficient condition in this systems-based meta-definition. Thus, the proposed definition allows for several 'pathways' to characterize an event as extreme:
If a system does not display elements with atypical, i.e. extreme behaviour initially or subsequently, but is nevertheless impeded in its normal functioning, it means that the extreme event originated from within a different, but linked system. Such a systemic disturbance can also be caused by extreme behaviour of some element(s) within the system, can also feature significant impacts, but L.H. Broska, et al. Futures 115 (2020) 102490 can likewise be caused by an unfortunate compounding of commonplace events, or by an ordinary event befalling a vulnerable system. A particular case of such vulnerability are elements critical to the overall functioning of the system, e.g. critical infrastructures. In such circumstances one ordinary event hitting that one vulnerable element can result in an extreme event. Fig. 1 gives only a simplified picture. Conceptually speaking but also observable in practice, the phenomenon of other factors playing a role, or other events coinciding, is not indicated directly in the flowchart. Furthermore, attributing any impact to a L.H. Broska, et al. Futures 115 (2020) 102490 particular event, i.e. one causal agent, with absolute certainty will not be possible. At first glance, the proposed definition may seem to be at odds with those disciplines and authors who exclude impacts in their definitions of extreme events for systemic effects can be seen as impacts of a higher order. Reviewing the literature not a single event labelled extreme was found that did not also fit this meta-definition. There seems to be a pattern of explicitly excluding impacts when defining extreme events while simultaneously implicitly only declaring events extreme that cause severe impacts on the systemic level (see e.g. IPCC (2012) for examples).
From a practical point of view arises the question of empirical evidence for the presented definition. The definition shall be understood as a conceptual base for interdisciplinary exchange of knowledge. An overarching empirical benchmarking seems to be dependent on the precise contextan extreme event analysed in climate research will happen under other circumstances than e.g. in cytology. Additionally, the perception of impacts by researchers and affected personsif present in the event under observationcould differ significantly, influencing what impacts will be identified in the first place, and whether these impacts will be declared extreme (Leonard et al., 2014) . This superordinate, systems-based definition escapes these subjectivities to a large extent by not collecting individual impacts but looking at the overall picture of an event.
Thus, the proposed meta-definition is uniquely fitting for interdisciplinary research because it is non-arbitrary and does not require thresholds to be set, and therefore no measurements, while at the same time not forbidding to do so on a disciplinary level where this is possible, as in natural sciences. Simultaneously, it grants disciplines in the social sciences, e.g. history, that are less able to define clear cut-off points to apply the proposed definition as well. If utilized consistently across disciplines, their results become comparable and knowledge transfers are facilitated. Furthermore, the possibility arises to categories, i.e. create a classification system, for extreme events across disciplines and of all scales despite their multidimensionality. As will be shown in the following case study, the proposed definition is ideal for cascades of (extreme) events. Each event in a causal chain can be identified separately, as well as how they are connected and how each is extreme in it's own unique way. The application of the systems approach highlights the possibility for various scientific fields to gain insights from complexity and systems science where the behaviour of systems is studied methodically and conceptually.
Applying the definitionthe 2006 European Blackout as a case study
The following section will highlight particular aspects of applying the definition and the complexity of the topic extreme events by using the 2006 European Blackout, a historic event that had large ramifications for the European electrical system, as a case study.
The system
Silvast and Kaplinsky (2007) describe the electricity system as "a series of tightly interlocking technical and social networks", of which one is the transmission grid. It is crucial for a wide variety of social and economic activities, with its importance further increasing due to technological development, the proliferation of electrical devices in all areas of human activity, and a dependence of other infrastructure services on a steady supply of electricity. Through these developments on the consumption side, vulnerability is increasing (Reichl, Schmidthaler, & Schneider, 2013) . A disruption in electricity supply can have severe impacts, especially in highly developed and technologized countries. Thus, it is part of the group of critical infrastructures and a system interlinked with many other systems.
The event(s)
The course of events, which ultimately led to the 2006 Blackout affecting consumers of electricity all over Europe, is described in detail in several reports (e.g. BNetzA (2007), ERGEG (2007), GRS (2014), and UCTE (2007)). On November 4, 2006, a shipyard requested to advance the disconnection of a high-voltage power line crossing the Ems River, so a ship could be transported safely towards the North Sea. A later date had already been approved by E.ON Netz, the transmission system operator (TSO) of the power line in question. They informed adjoining TSOs and performed analyses that showed the system would be alright, though highly loaded. The adjoining TSOs did likewise. All approved the action though none had actually calculated the n-1 criterion, which states that if a single component is disconnected, the power transmission network should all the same be able to function normally (Cadini, Agliardi, & Zio, 2017) . Because of little advance notice of the changed date, the exchange of power between Germany and the Netherlands, which used the power line in question, could not be reduced. Additionally, several network components were off-grid due to maintenance work (Yamashita, Joo, Li, Zhang, & Liu, 2008) . E.ON turned off the line at 9:39 p.m. local time.
In the time following the line-disconnection warning systems informed of high power flows on lines accommodating the removed line's load. At 10:07 p.m. the load increased on one of the lines beyond the safety limit value. E.ON reacted by coupling busbars in a nearby substation. RWE, a TSO also affected by the immediate situation, was not informed of it. Contrary to expectations, this did not resolve the situation but led to a rise in the current on the line which was automatically tripped at 10:10 p.m.
Within seconds load flow increased on other lines and a cascade of line trippings throughout Europe followed at the end of which Europe's UCTE system split into three sub-systems of different frequencies with the Western areaa map of the zones can be found in the UCTE report (2007)far below the necessary 50 Hz because of too little power generation, the same of slightly less severity was observed in the South-Eastern zone, while the North-Eastern zone had a higher than necessary frequency due to over-production. In the Western area the deficit was so severe that it led to automatic load shedding and, as a result, blackouts in almost all countries within that zone. Countermeasures were taken by the involved TSOs, and after less than two hours the three sub-systems were resynchronized, consumers reconnected, and all functions back to their original state.
The impacts
Though the European Blackout of 2006 is often cited as one of the major incidents of large scale power interruptions in the world (e.g. Bompard et al., 2011; Kröger, 2008; Yamashita et al., 2008) , no in-depth study on its impacts has been conducted. Thus, information is rudimentary with estimates remaining rough and largely incomplete. A reason might be its rather short duration of less than two hours with most experiencing power outage for just half an hour. This fact is likely also the reason why this blackout has been put forward as proof for the counter-argument: it showed how robust the system is; the system failure was contained and repaired efficiently (Van der Vleuten & Lagendijk, 2010a) .
Sources list the following impacts: Some 20 European countries along with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in North Africa were affected (Van der Vleuten & Lagendijk, 2010b) . Over 15 million European households experienced power outages, which lasted up to 1.5 h (BNetzA, 2007) . Furthermore, 100 trainsthe majority of which in Germanywere delayed, and subways had to be evacuated (CRO Forum, 2011) .
Probably a more accurate depiction of the blackout's severity is the amount of load shedding that occurred, which was almost 17,000 MW (UCTE, 2007) . Due to the changes in frequency some generation units were also tripped: 60 percent of wind turbines generating power at the time, 30 percent of combined-heat-and-power, along with one thermal generation unit of about 700 MW in Spain, resulting in a total of some 10,900 MW (UCTE, 2007) . Several generating units in Poland had to be turned off, and generation output had to be decreased from full load in several nuclear power plants in Germany and Switzerland (GRS, 2014) . On the other hand, generation unitsthe majority of which, hydropower plantshad to be started manually in the Western area so frequency would be restored to its usual 50 Hz. An evaluation of the impacts in monetary terms, even as rough estimates, is challenging, as studies by Growitsch, Malischek, Nick, and Wetzel (2013) and Piaszeck, Wenzel, and Wolf (2013) have shown and was therefore not attempted in this study.
Beyond these obvious and immediate impacts, the European electricity system was affected far more fundamentally longer term. The blackout was used as an example to underline the vulnerability of the European power grid in debates by EU policy makers demanding reforms towards centralized governance (Van der Vleuten & Lagendijk, 2010b). Consequently actions were taken towards reinforcing the EU's authority by creating an EU-wide regulator for power grids, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and terminating the UCTE and the Nordic Electricity Union (NORDEL), which merged to become the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) in 2009 (Van der Vleuten & Högselius, 2012). Though these developments cannot be attributed solely to the 2006 Blackout, but also a previous blackout in 2003, which lasted for up to 18 h and affected some 56 million people (Panteli, 2013) , and political ambitions within the EU (Van der Vleuten & Lagendijk, 2010b), these developments need to be included in considerations of the occurrence's impacts.
Discussion of the case study
The 2006 Blackout, clearly a dynamic occurrence within a limited timeframe and thus an event, is arguably rare in occurrence, considering major blackouts in developed regions similar to the European Union (see lists of major blackouts in, e.g., (Bompard et al., 2011; Kröger, 2008; Yamashita et al., 2008) ). The geographical scale of the 2006 Blackout (the UCTE and parts of North Africa were affected) adds to the Blackout being an occurrence extreme. Taking into consideration the number of consumers affected and the number of countries involved, an impact extreme appears to be at hand, despite the fragmentary information on its effects.
The reason as to why the 2006 Blackout is labelled an extreme event, becomes obvious when returning to the context of the definition: the complex system approach. In the short term, the incident caused the disruption of the entire UCTE system's normal functioning; during the two-hour time frame Europe's entire electricity system was in turmoil, triggered by the removal of just one high-voltage power line. Its long-term impacts, together with other factors irrevocably changed the EU regulatory bodies of the electricity system.
Thus, the event highlights the necessity of defining extreme events not via singular elements' behaviour, which would cause difficulties and imprecision through arbitrarily defined thresholdsas for instance, the number of households left without electricity but as disruptions for the larger system. Additionally, the interplay of many elements within a complex system is highlighted. Often it is not the event alone, but an unfortunate compounding of incidents and factors that lead to extreme impacts, as can be seen by the changes to the regulatory bodies of the European electricity grid.
The case study also distinguishes the role the system, in which the event occurs, has on whether the event is labelled extreme. A minor occurrence hitting a vulnerable system as vital to the hierarchically higher system as critical infrastructure, can cause extreme effects by cascading through the system and into other, related systems. In the end, this interdependence is at the core of such farreaching impacts and not the initial incident alone.
While the blackout is an extreme event, it is, assertably, not a disaster when applying Quarantelli's (1985) definition. This can also explain the dispute among experts whether the event proved the system's vulnerability, or instead robustness. The response was adequate, and the original functionality of the system was re-established within the time frame of two hours. Therefore, in this instance, the two terms, extreme event and disaster, are not congruent.
Cascading effects are typical features of complex systems (Holling, 2001; WEF, 2018) , in particular through interconnectedness, which, in turn, is especially inherent to critical infrastructures. The cascade described in this case study concerns the surge of power line trippings that ultimately led to the load shedding and blackout across parts of Europe. Each of these line trippings is an event with each power line constituting an element within the electrical grid, i.e. the system. Likewise, the entire blackout is an event if the power grid is seen as an element of the energy system. Thus, the case study highlights an issue intrinsic to the proposed definition: scale. Microlevel and macrolevel occurrences alike can be declared extreme events. However, in this particular case, only the latter is actually the extreme event since each single line tripping is only an event, but did not have systemic impacts, only in coming together, did they have the disruptive effect on the electricity system's functioning.
Discussion
Interestingly, the shortcomings of the classic definition of extreme events by the IPCC (2007), focussing on the extreme of one variable, has been recognised in part in its special report "Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters…", in which the term 'compound event' is introduced (IPCC, 2012). It observes that many events, frequently declared prime examples for extreme events, e.g. floods and droughts, are not caused by one factor alone. A compounding of events and the condition of the system, within which it occurs, together cause the event. However, considering the attribute "complex" that most of the world's systems receive, there exist a wide variety of factors defining an event. Therefore, the difficulty arises of regarding all the right factors. The issue is further exacerbated when extremes are to be empirically determined and thresholds need to be set, which can never be definitively done. This is also the cause for the murky discussion of occurrence as well as impact extremeness in the case study of the European Blackout of 2006. It makes the definition of extreme events via occurrence extremes and impact extremes alone highly problematic. The systemic approach taken here is not hampered by thresholds. Undoubtedly, their determination can represent a challenge as well for a system's functionalities must be known and its typical behaviour well studied.
Because of the complex systems approach the definition is not impervious to the issue of scale. A system can be both large and relatively small. An extreme event is caused by the behaviour of an element which is embedded within a system and evokes effects beyond itself within the system, or even in hierarchically higher systems. Epileptic seizures are frequently cited as prime examples of extreme events (see, e.g., Lehnertz, 2006; Sornette, 2009) , with the brain as the complex system under observation. On a vastly different scale an earthquake can be an extreme event just as well.
Furthermore, systemic disruptions and thus extreme events demand to be looked at from a different perspective as well: they can be seen as drivers of transformations. Gunderson and Holling (2001) and Holling (2001) describe extreme events as triggers for the collapses of human and natural systems. In the same vein Sornette (2017) sums up their relevance for complex systems: The behaviour of complex systems is shaped significantly by few extreme events, and their evolutionary process is marked, not by continual dynamics but rather "quasi-stasis interrupted by episodic bursts of activity and destruction" (Sornette, 2017, p. 19) . Therefore, extreme events from a systems perspective are those instances expediting the evolution of a system. As catalysts for change the effects of events cannot automatically be judged as negative. In essence, this is the idea of Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1950) , in which, in the wake of an event generating extreme impacts on the systemic level, the reconstruction and rebuilding phase sees innovation and improvement of the system.
Conclusions and outlook
The term extreme events, in use in a wide variety of disciplines, is understood to mean either an event extreme in its occurrence, or because its impacts can be defined as extreme. The beginnings of the term's usage in a scientific context were in disciplines such as meteorology, climatology, and mathematics, and focussed on the first option. Starting with social sciences, then quickly spreading into natural sciences, an event's impacts were included in the term's definition.
After applying a complex systems approach to dissect and look at the term's separate elements, i.e. events, impacts, and extremes, we propose a meta-definition that allows the initial occurrence as well as its impacts to be extreme but demands a malfunction in the larger system to be prerequisite. We argue that this way of defining events does not go against the term's previous usages across disciplines, rather that it is applicable in all instances and uniquely suited for interdisciplinary research. The wide variety of events falling under the category extreme events, make it impossible to define clear-cut thresholds for when an event is to be called extreme. The resulting definition is therefore broad; it includes small-and large-scale events alike.
The application of the proposed definition in a case study of the Europe-wide blackout in 2006 throws the spotlight on some particularities of extreme events and the proposed definition: First of all, there are cascading effects, caused by systems' proliferating interconnectedness and vulnerability and resulting in increasing impacts. This phenomenon of several initial events ordinary in isolation coming together to cause a cascade of ever-worsening impacts resulting in an extreme event is of particular importance for systems modelling where such occurrences are rarely looked at conjointly. Second, the description of the European electricity system, in which the case study's event occurred, and particularly the events and the impact's extensive nature, revealed vulnerability of systems as significant in causing extreme events.
The debate in the aftermath of the 2006 European Blackout on whether the incident proved the system's robustness, or conversely vulnerability, highlighted an issue that could only be hinted at within the scope of this paper: extremeness of impacts is inherently dependent on how the impacts are perceived. Only if stakeholders subjectively consider the event's impacts to be extreme, can they be declared as such. In future research, it may be interesting to ponder how and to what extend perception and attitudes towards occurrences shape the definition of extreme events across disciplines with a focus on impacts in their definitions.
